Fanon, Hegel and Colonial Violence

1. Introduction

In the summer of 2021, the German federal government passed an agreement in which it assumed responsibility for the genocide of the Namibian peoples of the Herero and Nama and offered an official apology. Namibia, or German South-West Africa as it was called more than a hundred years ago, was a German colony from 1884 to 1915. Between 1904 and 1908, German occupying forces exterminated tens of thousands of the Herero and Nama population. As part of this agreement, Germany pledged a total of 1.1 billion euros in development aid over a period of 30 years (Pütz, 2023). However, these payments are not reparations, as the German ambassador to Namibia, Christian Matthias Schlaga, clarified in a lecture in 2019. The term “reparations” implies “a certain legal obligation” (Leuschner, 2019). It took Germany over a hundred years to acknowledge its colonial past in Africa and the genocides committed there. “Fear of acknowledging the genocide and the resulting legal consequences—above all reparations—has been a constant in German politics across all changes of government” (Zimmerer, 2019). The concept of recognition here assumes a legal dimension.

The term “recognition” also plays a central role in philosophy, especially in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. This philosophical treatise was essential for the Enlightenment, German Idealism, and many subsequent thinkers. In particular, Hegel’s theoretical framework of dialectics—dividing a theoretical paradigm into thesis, antithesis, and synthesis—inspired numerous reinterpretations, elaborations, and applications across a wide range of fields. One intellectual who drew heavily on Hegel was psychiatrist and philosopher Frantz Fanon, born in 1925 in the French colony of Martinique. Fanon focused mainly on the African decolonization movement and was actively involved in liberation struggles, such as the French-Algerian war of 1954. Hegel’s influence on Fanon will be explored through three central aspects that are relevant in Fanon’s works Black Skin, White Masks and The Wretched of the Earth. These aspects include: the objectification of colonized natives by European colonial powers; recognition as a potential remedy for such objectification; and the role of violence in the colonial context and how it might assist the colonized in their liberation efforts.

This analysis aims to highlight the influence of Hegelian philosophy on Fanon’s theories and to analyze the distinct role of violence in both philosophers’ thinking. As will become clear throughout this text, Hegel’s dialectical framework is a key component of Fanon’s theory—not as a literal reproduction of existing ideas, but as a foundation upon which Fanon builds and expands within a colonial context. Violence also takes on a more multifaceted and multidimensional form in Fanon’s work than in his source of inspiration.

In this text, the terms colonialist, master, the white man, and colonized, native, the Black man, will be used interchangeably for clarity. No distinction will be made between singular and plural forms to emulate Fanon’s language. When Fanon speaks of “the white man,” “the Black man,” or “the colonized,” he uses the masculine singular form to represent the entirety of each respective group (Gordon, 2015: p. 22). We begin with a closer look at the dialectical characteristics in Fanon’s writings.

2. Fanon’s Hegelian Dialectic

Hegel’s influence on Fanon becomes evident not only in the final chapter of his debut work Black Skin, White Masks, which bears the title “The N[****] and Hegel,” but is woven throughout the entire text. Especially Hegel’s theoretical concepts of the master–slave dialectic and recognition provide the foundation for Fanon’s observation of the objectification of colonized subjects, as well as the potential remedy in the form of mutual recognition. It should be noted, however, that Fanon’s use of the “master–slave dialectic” is based on a mistranslation of Hegel’s German terms “Herr” (master) and “Knecht” (servant) into French (Kistner & Van Haute, 2020: p. xv). Yet, the translation of Hegel’s terms into “master” and “slave” more accurately reflects the power dynamics in the colonial context, as Fanon describes the oppressed people of the African continent as “former slaves” (Fanon, 2013: p. 183).

A central component of Hegel’s dialectic is the relationship between the “self” and the “other,” in which the “self” can establish and become aware of itself by distancing itself from the supposed “other.” However, the European colonial master not only differentiates himself from the colonized, but also does not see them as sufficiently human to even meet them on an equal level within the “self–other” relationship. The master sees the colonized as inferior, as inhuman, as a thing to be exploited.

2.1. Fanon on Objectification

The colonized person is, from birth, an “object among other objects” (Fanon, 2013: p. 93). Fanon opens the fifth chapter of Black Skin, White Masks, titled “The Lived Experience of the Black Man,” with this observation. It makes clear that the reification of those under colonial rule is ever-present and inescapable in the colonial situation. But how exactly does this objectification manifest in colonial society?

As soon as the colonized person comes into contact with the white world, they are automatically confronted with the dichotomy of “self” and “other,” whereby they are positioned opposite the white colonialist (ibid.: pp. 93–94). However, instead of being able to confront the supposed “other” and thereby establish their own “self,” the white person meets them with indifference; he “doesn’t give a damn about the slave’s consciousness” (ibid.: p. 215), even though the (former) slave desperately strives to gain such consciousness in order to satisfy their own ontology. The white person, however, attributes “no ontological resistance” to the colonized (ibid.: p. 94). The Black person must therefore face a metaphysics that not only challenges their entire worldview and self-image but also refuses to engage with them on equal philosophical terms.

This is why philosopher Lewis R. Gordon argues in What Fanon Said – A Philosophical Introduction to His Life and Thought that the colonized should be placed below the “self–other” relationship, since racism and colonial oppression deny them all attributes of the self and supposed characteristics of the other (2015: p. 69).

White supremacy not only separates the white person from the Black person, but places the former above the latter. This hierarchical elevation is achieved by the master through various mental and physical degradations of the colonized. For one, the white man creates an exaggerated caricature of the colonized: the essential Black. “The Black man” is expected to prove his humanity by transcending the boundaries of his “race” (ibid.: p. 24) or by completely shedding it. If he fails to do so (since he had never had to confront his racialized identity before the “white gaze”), he loses the status of “human” and finds himself in a kind of limbo “... below whites but above creatures” (ibid.: p. 23).

This degradation becomes particularly clear in the terms used by the white man to describe the colonized. They are accused of being closer to animals than to humans; zoological labels are invented to categorize this new “type” or “species” of human being (Fanon, 2021: p. 35). This “myth of the n[****]” (Mbembe, 2019: p. 138) serves the white colonial masters to justify treating the colonized as things—as objects. Fanon refers to this act of perception as the “white gaze” (2013: p. 94).

This “white gaze” represents for the native their first confrontation with the white world, with whiteness, and with their own “race.” During this initial encounter between the two worlds, metaphorical chains are placed upon them, and an alleged way of life is imposed. Chains that imprison them within their “race,” their “ethnic traits” (ibid.: p. 96), and impose boundaries that had not previously existed—a savage, primitive way of life that is deemed in need of civilization. The chains of the “white gaze” paralyze the colonized, strip them of any form of subjective humanity, and reduce them to the external and the two-dimensional (Gordon, 2015: p. 48).

Another consequence of the white gaze and the ensuing paralysis is a penetrating passivity that seizes the colonized. From one moment to the next, they find themselves caught in a dynamic in which they no longer act or live out their own being actively, but are subjected to externally imposed actions (Marasco, 2015: p. 149). This imposed passivity leads to a crushing inertia, causing the colonized to internalize the degradations and inferiorities they experience (Stawarska, 2020: p. 100). This internalization of supposed inferiority creates an inferiority complex within the colonized that they are now forced to embody and reproduce (Hildebrandt, 2021: p. 120). Thus, white supremacy is not only imposed by the colonial powers—it becomes a part of colonial reality.

At this point, Fanon integrates his experience as a psychiatrist into his analysis. The pathologies and neuroses that arise in the colonized under colonial oppression prevent them from living out and demonstrating their humanity—that is, from asserting their “self.” Once they are unable or forbidden to express their humanity, they enter what Fanon describes as the “zone of non-being” (Fanon, 2013: p. 120). This zone is the amalgamation of the symptoms of colonial oppression and represents the metaphysical place below the “self–other” relationship (Gordon, 2015: pp. 22–23). It is a world of objects and things in which the colonized are denied all subjectivity.

Fanon emphasizes the necessity of transcendence in order to escape objectivity and regain subjectivity. To enable the transcendence of colonial objects, Fanon again turns to Hegel. Here, he adopts the Hegelian concept of recognition (Fanon, 2013: p. 183). This transcendent recognition will be examined more closely in the next section.

2.2. Fanon on Recognition

Recognition plays a central role in Hegel’s concept of self-consciousness. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, he describes self-consciousness as being “in and for itself by being for another; that is, it is only as something that is acknowledged” (Hegel, 2011: p. 127). For the self to come into being in and for itself, it must be acknowledged and affirmed by the other. Hegel further emphasizes the necessity of mutual recognition, since both the self and the other are autonomous, independent entities. Both actors face each other as equals and “recognize each other as mutually recognizing” (ibid.: p. 129).

Fanon agrees with Hegel that one’s humanity is conditioned by the recognition of others and that his dialectic is based on absolute reciprocity (Fanon, 2013: p. 183). However, Fanon focuses on the flip side of recognition: unfulfilled or denied recognition. As previously described, the Black colonized and the white colonial master do not face each other as equals; the master positions himself above the colonized. In Hegel’s master–slave dialectic, there is also an inequality in the relationship between the two antagonists. Yet, the slave can assert himself against the master and thereby establish his self-consciousness by engaging in a life-or-death struggle. This confrontation also opens a possibility for the master to transcend his own existence (Hegel, 2011: p. 130).

Fanon tries to apply this prerequisite for transcendence to the colonial situation, but an immediate problem arises. The Black slave did not assert himself against the master—he did not engage in open struggle. Rather, the white master “acknowledged him without a fight” (Fanon, 2013: p. 183), even though recognition must be earned to fulfill the conditions of transcendence. Hegel himself warns against a self that does not prove itself in battle. An individual who does not risk their life will never attain the status of autonomous self-consciousness (Hegel, 2011: p. 131), as recognition in that case fails to function.

Fanon’s notion of recognition without struggle closely resembles the paralyzing passivity imposed on the colonized. In this case too, recognition comes externally; it was not actively fought for. “The n[****] is a slave who has been allowed to assume the role of master. The white man is a master who has allowed his slave to sit at his table” (Fanon, 2013: p. 185). When Fanon speaks of recognition without struggle, he refers to legal recognition or emancipation. However, the problem of unfulfilled recognition persists even when legal equality is granted to the colonized—they did not earn it through struggle. The colonized now stand in the master’s debt. They have received his grace, which may formally end the oppression, but which in practice continues within European (i.e., white) structures, institutions, and ideas (Purtschert, 2008: p. 926).

Hegel offers the slave another possibility to consolidate his independent self-consciousness: work. Through labor, the consciousness that is still for-itself becomes conscious of itself. In the process of labor, the object—the “thing”—attains autonomy. The object acquires form and permanence through the negation of labor. The for-itself-being of consciousness is expressed in the formative act of labor, which preserves it and demonstrates to consciousness its own independent being (Hegel, 2011: p. 135). Thus, the slave can transcend his consciousness through constructive work. For Hegel, then, work—alongside recognition—represents a path to subjectivation.

However, at this point, Fanon departs from Hegel’s account. In the colonial context, labor has no relevance for the consciousness of the oppressed. Labor in colonialism is purely an economic tool performed by a body with no standpoint of its own (Gordon, 2015: p. 69). The colonial master does not perceive the colonized as equal business partners or employees; he sees them merely as machines and consumable objects. The white man needs nothing from the colonized apart from their physical labor—he is not dependent on their recognition to transcend his own consciousness (Fanon, 2013: p. 215). Since labor offers the oppressed Black man no substitute for absolute recognition, he must turn to other means. The only option that remains is the life-or-death struggle—to earn recognition and reclaim subjectivity. Violence now becomes the only available method to force the colonizer to acknowledge the humanity of the colonized natives (Jean-Marie, 2007: p. 9) and at the same time provide them with true freedom.

3. Fanon on Emancipatory Violence

“The relation of both self-consciousnesses [i.e., of self and other] is thus determined in such a way that they must prove themselves and each other through a struggle to the death. – They must enter this struggle, for they must raise their self-certainty, their being-for-themselves, to truth both in the other and in themselves.”
— Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 2011, p. 130

Hegel describes the struggle between two dialectically opposed antagonists as a means of confirming their own subjectivity. If the “self” is denied recognition, or the recognition offered is not reciprocated, it must fight to earn that recognition. Likewise, Fanon’s colonized object must confront the colonial master and overcome his resistance. When the resistance of the adversary threatens one’s own life, the colonized gains the courage to risk everything in order to preserve their humanity. Victory in this confrontation allows self-consciousness to transcend its current state. After surpassing the boundaries of reified objecthood and affirming their own subjective humanity, the objective, universal truth also transcends the merely subjective certainty (Fanon, 2013: p. 184). The fight between Fanon’s colonized and the colonizer is a violent one. The violence inherent in this life-or-death struggle will now be examined in more detail.

Violence in the colonial context is not a one-dimensional phenomenon; it takes various forms and gradations. Beata Stawarska identifies three types of colonial violence in Fanon’s texts: objective violence, negative-reactive violence, and positive-transformative violence.

Objective violence refers to the intrinsic violence exercised by all institutions participating in the Manichaean colonial regime. The worldview of these regimes follows pure Manichaeism in its division of the world into two clearly separated categories: good and evil. Needless to say, the European colonial power sees itself as the embodiment of the good. To depict the natives as the embodiment of evil, they claim that the colonized society is a world devoid of morality or values. These people are deemed unreachable by civilized, European standards and must be rescued from their destructive, violent nature (Fanon, 2021: p. 34).

Here, the contradiction underlying colonial violence becomes evident. On one hand, European colonial powers preach the virtues of freedom, equality, and brotherly love; in reality, however, they inflict unspeakable atrocities upon the colonized natives (Stawarska, 2020: pp. 105–106). This contradictory, irrational dissonance between the words and deeds of the colonial powers is described by Robyn Marasco as institutionalized madness masquerading as civilization (2015: p. 158). The so-called “civilizing of the savages” serves as justification for the colonial powers to exploit territories and violently suppress their populations.

Negative, reactive violence arises as a reversal of the objective colonial violence. Referring back to Hegel, the violence of the colonized constitutes the antithesis, whereas colonial violence represents the thesis in the dialectic of violence. Faced with everyday oppression, the colonized develop a desire for revenge. In this moment of confrontation—when the colonized rise up against their masters—the “universal,” Eurocentric moral order is suspended. The violence of the colonized takes on its own moral dimension, one that does not need to be authorized by their oppressors. Extralegal violence and vigilante justice now occupy a space within this new moral dimension (Stawarska, 2020: pp. 106–107).

One can already anticipate the outcome of such polarized, “black-and-white” thinking. The violence of the colonized begins to resemble that which it once aimed to destroy. Fanon is fully aware of this dilemma. He writes: “The Manichaeism of the colonial rulers produces a Manichaeism of the colonized. The theory of the 'native as absolute evil' is answered by the theory of the 'colonizer as absolute evil'” (Fanon, 2021: p. 76). This insight clarifies the role of spontaneous, reactive counter-violence as antithesis. Yet, Fanon is also aware that vengeance operating on the Old Testament principle of “an eye for an eye” is not suitable for the transcendence and liberation of the colonized. Destruction must be followed by reconstruction (Kistner, 2020: p. xviii), otherwise no new nation can rise from the ruins of the colonial regime, nor can the consciousness of the colonized transcend its objectified oppression. At this point, the third and final form of violence comes into play.

Finally, the violence of the colonized transforms into a constructive, creative force. The transition from reactive to constructive violence is fluid. This violence unites the colonized under the banner of decolonization, dissolving the rigid dualism of colonial order. Like the colonized people who wield it, this violence transcends its own boundaries and gains transformative qualities.

Violence offers the colonized a means to purge their inferiority complex and their passivity (Fanon, 2021: pp. 76–77). Fanon uses the term “detoxifying” to describe the effect of violence (ibid.). The degradations and objectification of the colonized have embedded themselves like an illness or neurosis into the bodies and minds of the oppressed. Violence becomes the cure for that illness (Marasco, 2015: p. 158). In this sense, the effects of violence can be compared to the Aristotelian concept of catharsis—the release from psychological conflict through emotional action (Gordon, 2015: p. 114).

Once the colonized have rid themselves of their internalized inferiority, they regain their status as subjective human beings. They are thus granted entry into the world of morality and human dignity (Stawarska, 2020: p. 101). The transcendence of their self-consciousness becomes accessible to them, for they have earned the recognition of the Other through victory in their struggle. This positive, constructive violence forms the synthesis in Hegel’s dialectical paradigm.

To summarize again: violence in the colonial context can be illustrated through Hegel’s dialectic of thesis–antithesis–synthesis. The objective, oppressive violence of the European colonial powers represents the thesis. This violence is embedded in the colonial system and harms the natives both physically and psychologically. The anti-colonial counter-violence, exercised by the oppressed themselves, functions as the antithesis. This spontaneous, passionate violence emerges as a response to colonial violence and from a desire to strike back. It is its dialectical opposite. The synthesis refers to the outcome of the violence between these two antagonistic entities. Violence transcends the narrow perspective of revenge and becomes a tool for rebuilding the decolonized nation. Both the colonized and the colonizer experience, through their violent confrontation, absolute recognition from the Other. Both adversaries can thus consolidate their self-consciousness in and for itself and establish themselves as objective truths.

Fanon and Hegel agree: Struggle and violence lead to the true freedom of the individual (Hegel, 2011: pp. 130–131). Be it Hegel’s servant or Fanon’s former slave—after risking their lives and reaching the transcendence of their selves, both prove their freedom. Both affirm their active self by being willing to die for “that which is most human in man: freedom” (Fanon, 2013: p. 187).

4. Summary and Conclusion

In conclusion, Hegel’s influence on Fanon can be summarized as follows: Fanon begins the chapter on lived experience in Black Skin, White Masks with an analysis of sociogenesis—the emergence of “illnesses” due to social conditions. In the colonial context, these arise as soon as the colonized come into contact with the white colonial powers. When these two entities meet, each attempts to distinguish itself from the other. Thus emerges the “self–other dichotomy.” However, instead of facing the other as an equal, the colonial masters push the Black person beneath this level of reciprocal relation through contempt and indifference.

Since the Black person is not considered fully human in the eyes of Europeans, they are degraded to the status of an animal, an object, a thing. These humiliations and degradations have negative effects on the psyche and self-consciousness of the colonized. They develop an inferiority complex, internalize their own objectification, and reproduce it in their environment. They are trapped in the “zone of non-being,” a kind of hell on earth (Gordon, 2015: p. 23). They wish to prove their humanity and rid themselves of this imposed inferiority—but the prison of objecthood denies them this chance.

In order to escape objectivity, the colonized turn to Hegel’s concept of recognition. Through absolute, reciprocal recognition, self-consciousness can establish itself. It can transform from a superficial for-itself self-consciousness into one in-and-for-itself. Fanon, however, finds that recognition in the colonial context lacks reciprocity. The partial, legal recognition granted to the colonized by colonial masters does not fulfill the requirements for transcendence. It is a gift, not a struggle—it has not been earned. This recognition is merely an empty gesture from the master, intended to demonstrate goodwill.

In Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, labour offers the servant a substitute for the denied recognition. Labour, with its negating and constructive properties, enables the servant to transcend his consciousness. However, this process does not apply to the colonial context. The labour performed by the colonized is neither freely chosen nor constructive. They are not working people—they are working objects. To reclaim their humanity, they must turn to more radical means.

Violence offers the resolution to the conflict between master and slave for both Hegel and Fanon. Through a struggle to the death, both antagonists can affirm their self-consciousness and ascend to a higher level of awareness. Fanon describes three forms of violence using Hegel’s dialectical model: Objective violence carried out by colonial powers to maintain the colonial system represents the thesis. Reactive, vengeful violence from the colonized is the antithesis, a direct answer to colonial violence. The synthesis is a positive, constructive violence that strips away objecthood and restores subjectivity. Only through violence can the colonized reclaim their freedom and destroy their structural oppression.

Fanon draws upon several of Hegel’s theoretical concepts. The dynamic between self and other provides the framework for the establishment of self-consciousness through opposition. The master–slave dialectic illustrates the conflict between “the white man” and “the Black man” and introduces the concept of recognition. Recognition and violence both play central roles in the process of transcendence and the path to objective truth.

However, Fanon does not agree with Hegel on all points—as evidenced by their different treatment of labor in the process of liberation. All in all, we can say that Frantz Fanon expands and enriches Hegelian philosophy by applying it to the colonial context. His theories are not only a profound contribution to Hegelian dialectics but also an essential foundation of postcolonial studies. His works are both timely and timeless. They eloquently describe the conditions of 20th-century colonialism and provide a detailed revolutionary manual for future liberation struggles.

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This Text was translated into English by AI.